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Over the past 15 years, U.S. federal initiatives like Race to the 
Top (RTTT) and the Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) have 
pushed states and districts to incorporate individual measures 
of student growth into teacher evaluation systems (Berg-
Jacobson, 2016). That requirement is often met by linking 
teachers to their students’ growth on end-of-year (EOY) state-
wide assessments (e.g., value-added measures [VAMs]), par-
ticularly in math and English language arts (ELA) in Grades 4 
to 8. Yet this strategy raises at least two challenges. The first is 
logistical: VAMs can only be produced for teachers in tested 
subjects and grades—about 20% to 30% of a district’s teach-
ers. A second concern is that evaluation systems linked solely 
to EOY tests fail to incorporate teachers’ professional exper-
tise and knowledge of their students.
There have been a number of responses to these chal-
lenges but one that may address both is implementing stu-
dent learning objectives (SLOs) systems. District SLO 
systems mandate a process by which teachers establish con-
crete, annual learning targets for their students, typically on 
some assessment chosen at the classroom, school, or district 
level. Since the SLO process does not necessarily rely on 
statewide tests, the approach can be used to cover a broader 
spectrum of teacher roles. Because teachers are more directly 
involved determining what reasonable goals should be, there 
is more reliance on the teacher’s professional judgment and 
their knowledge of the student’s context. The act of setting 
clear goals, along with having ambitious expectations for 
learners, may help teachers inform and improve their daily 
practice. These aspects of SLOs make them a potential lever 
for addressing the shortcomings of teacher evaluation sys-
tems that rely solely on teacher VAMs described above.
Little is known about how SLO systems are implemented 
in practice. In particular, teachers are not necessarily trained 
on how to select appropriate learning objectives on the given 
assessment their school or district has adopted. Moreover, 
when teachers are evaluated based on whether their students 
meet the very objectives the teachers set at the beginning of 
the school year, there appears to be a perverse incentive to 
set low targets. The success of SLO systems relies on the 
premise that teachers are willing and able to set appropri-
ately ambitious goals for their students each year.
We describe target-setting behaviors within an SLO sys-
tem piloted for 4 years in a subset of schools in a southeastern 
school district. We describe this district’s SLO system in 
greater detail below, but it is relevant to know at the outset 
that this district also used SLOs for a pay-for-performance 
policy; if fewer than 50% of a teacher’s students did not meet 
the targets, they would not receive any bonus (up to $5,000). 
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How will teachers choose to enact a system that may run 
counter to their own interests (i.e., setting higher targets 
could lead to lower evaluations, losing a bonus)? The pur-
pose of this article is therefore twofold: We provide new 
descriptive insights on how teachers set their SLOs for differ-
ent students and on different assessments, and we examine 
associations between SLO targets and student outcomes.
SLO Policy Landscape
SLOs have gained traction quickly in part because sev-
eral of the U.S. Department of Education’s grant initiatives 
(e.g., NCLB waivers, RTTT, the Teacher Incentive Fund 
[TIF] grant) have endorsed SLOs as a way to satisfy the 
requirement to measure student growth in nontested subjects 
and grades (U.S. Department of Education, 2012). There is 
considerable variability in what could constitute an SLO 
system, but the DoE has described the SLO process as
[a] participatory method of setting measurable goals, or objectives, 
based on the specific assignment or class, such as the students 
taught, the subject matter taught, the baseline performance of the 
students, and the measurable gain in student performance during the 
course of instruction. (RTTT Technical Assistance Network, 2010)
Inherent in this definition is room for flexibility about 
who chooses the assessments and the extent to which assess-
ments must be comparable across classrooms and schools.
As of 2015, about 30 states already either recommend or 
require SLOs (Lachlan-Haché, 2015). We are aware of one 
report that gathers information on SLO implementation in 
educator evaluator systems across states (Lacireno-Paquet 
et al., 2014). The current district’s SLO system has many of 
the most common features reported therein. Of the 30 states 
studied, the report finds that 23 use SLOs to evaluate indi-
vidual teachers, as opposed to teams of teachers or the entire 
school. In 26 states, the assessment used for SLOs was not 
chosen by teachers—rather, SLOs were based on a test used 
statewide (N = 14) or district/school-wide (N = 12). In 21 
states, the SLO-setting process required that SLOs are 
approved by an external evaluator, usually a principal or 
district leader. (A principal approves SLOs in the current 
district.) SLOs are sometimes linked to performance incen-
tives, particularly among districts receiving TIF grants. It is 
not clear how common this practice is across the United 
States, but several other large districts have experimented 
with this, including Denver Public Schools, Charlotte-
Mecklenburg schools, and Austin Independent School 
District (Lachlan-Haché et al., 2015).
In Figure 1, we reproduce a useful illustration initially 
developed by Lachlan-Haché et al. (2013) and widely 
adapted, which places SLO policies on a continuum: On the 
left side of Figure 1 are SLO approaches that emphasize 
greater teacher agency, while those on the right side of Figure 
1 emphasize greater comparability. The current district’s 
SLO process falls on the right side of the Figure 1 continuum 
because teachers do not select an assessment of their choice.
Early research documents some of the challenges districts 
experience with SLO implementation (Delaware Department 
of Education, 2013; Donaldson et al., 2014; Lachlan-Haché, 
2015; Lachlan-Haché et al., 2013; Lamb et al., 2013; Schmitt, 
Cornetto, Lamb, & Imes, 2009; Slotnik, Smith, & Liang, 
2013).1 However, because these systems are relatively new, 
little research has yet attempted to describe teacher goal-set-
ting behavior.
Unique Contribution and Research Questions
One of our objectives is to fill this gap by documenting the 
accuracy and ambitiousness of the learning targets teachers 
set for their students, capturing the extent to which teachers 
are willing to set targets they may not reach (thereby reduc-
ing their bonus pay), and considering whether target-setting 
shifts across study years, varies by teacher effectiveness 
(proxied with VAMs), or is approached differently across the 
seven pilot schools.
The district we study provides a number of advantages for 
these questions. First, their particular version of an SLO pro-
cess uses the same assessments for each grade level across all 
schools, enabling us to compare target setting on the same 
FIGURE 1. Continuum of approaches to setting student learning objectives.
Note. Image adapted broadly, based on Lachlan-Haché et al. (2013).
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assessments across classrooms. Second, this district piloted 
an SLO system in which teachers had to select and document 
very specific targets—that is, in the fall, teachers combined 
their knowledge of their students with a review of the stu-
dent’s historical data to identify a score target for each child 
on each assessment (e.g., Grade 4 Teacher X sets as a goal 
that her Student Y will score a 221 on the math test at the end 
of this year).2 This practice provides an opportunity to explore 
variability in objectives across students in the same class. 
Finally, in Grades 4 through 8, teachers set targets on at least 
two different EOY tests (both in math and ELA), providing 
an additional source of variability.3
The goal of the current article is to provide the field with a 
thorough description of target-setting in an SLO system where 
not meeting targets is linked to decreased incentive pay. 
Because these pilot schools were selected based on low prior 
performance and high percentages of free-/reduced-price 
lunch (FRPL) eligible students, we also examine SLO target 
setting in a context under pressure to raise student outcomes. 
We organize our analyses into three research objectives:
1. Describe accuracy/ambitiousness of targets, percent 
of targets met, and variation in target-setting behav-
iors across schools, teachers, and study years
2. Document whether receiving higher targets predicts 
higher EOY test scores, for similar/same students/
schools
3. Assess possible evidence of differential target-set-
ting by race/ethnicity, conditional on prior achieve-
ment profile
Next, we provide details on the district and its SLO policy. 
Our literature review focuses on the potential mechanisms 
through which goal-setting might influence student out-
comes. We then describe the data and methods used to explore 
these research questions, present our findings, and conclude 
with a reflection on takeaways, limitations, and next steps.
The District and Its SLO Policy
The anonymous district in which this study takes place 
includes one of the largest cities and its surrounding area in 
a southeastern state. It has about 60 schools and serves 
around 50,000 students annually in a mix of urban, subur-
ban, and rural communities. In 2012, the majority (55%) of 
the students in the district were non-White. Specifically, 
36.9% of students were designated as Black, 6.5% as Asian, 
4.9% as Hispanic, and 6.1% as mixed or unknown race/eth-
nicity. The district covers a wide geographic area and has 
both high-poverty and low-poverty communities.
In 2010, the district was awarded a TIF grant to imple-
ment and evaluate the impact of a new performance-based 
employee compensation system in high-needs schools. Eight 
of the district’s highest needs schools were selected to par-
ticipate (more on sample below). Given TIF’s focus on 
incentive pay, the district needed a way to connect 
compensation to teacher performance in nontested subjects 
and grades, and SLOs were selected to fill that role.
Beginning in 2011–2012, teachers created a “learning 
contract” with their principal for each student in their class. 
Teachers did so by first examining each student’s test scores 
from the prior spring.4 The teacher then combined that infor-
mation with his/her own insight into the student’s context. 
By mid-November, the teacher committed to an annual 
growth target for each student.5 Teachers were not provided 
formal training on setting SLO targets. Because targets were 
reviewed by the principal, there was some oversight of 
teachers setting inappropriately low goals. We also will 
show that students did not meet the targets teachers set for 
them about 40% of the time, suggesting that teachers did not 
shy away from setting difficult-to-achieve targets.
The district opted to use uniform assessments across all 
students in the same grade. Each Grade 4 and 5 teacher 
selected score targets on four different assessments for each 
student each year—math and ELA scale score targets on the 
statewide standardized achievement test (pseudonym SSAT) 
and NWEA’s Measures of Academic Progress (MAP) spring 
math and ELA assessment.6 In Grades 6 to 8, a student’s math 
teacher set the two math targets (SSAT and MAP), while a 
different ELA teacher set the 2 ELA targets.7 SSAT results 
are high stakes since they play a central role in the state’s 
accountability policy, while the purpose of the MAP test is 
more formative. That said, since both the SSAT and MAP 
were used to determine the size of SLO incentive payments, 
both assessments had stakes attached to them in this context.
Teachers received incentive pay based on the percentage 
of their students who met their targets. If at least 50% of the 
teachers’ students met their target, they received a bonus 
between $2500 and $5000.8 If less than 50% of a teacher’s 
students met their target, they received no bonus. The aver-
age annual base salary for teachers was around $49,500 (and 
an SDof about $10,900), so that a $5000 bonus is sizeable—
about 10% of base pay for the average teacher.
Potential Mechanisms for SLO Impacts
A key driver of any link between SLO systems and 
improved student outcomes is the potential positive impacts 
of teachers setting high expectations for students. Researchers 
have long explored the positive association between teacher 
expectations and student outcomes (Jussim & Harber, 2005; 
Madon et al., 1997). Perhaps the best-known example is the 
Rosenthal and Jacobsen experiment from the mid-1960s in 
which the randomly selected students described to teachers 
as high-growth potential did exhibit higher EOY test scores 
(Rosenthal, 1987; Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968).9
Of course, teachers’ expectations are usually not randomly 
generated. Just because the students for whom the teachers 
have higher expectations tend to perform better does not imply 
that high expectations cause high performance. Teacher expec-
tations may correlate with achievement simply because 
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teachers can accurately anticipate subsequent performance. 
This ambiguity complicates any attempt to make a causal link 
between setting ambitious learning objectives and student out-
comes (Jussim & Harber, 2005; Papageorge et al., 2020). To 
tackle this, Papageorge et al. (2020) leveraged data from a 
nationally-representative 2002 cohort of 10th graders—wherein 
two different teachers provided their educational expectations 
for the same student. This conditionally exogenous variation in 
expectations within student was linked to increased likelihood 
of college completion, suggesting that teacher expectations 
indeed become so-called self-fulfilling prophecies.10
Even if we accept the premise that teacher expectations 
exert an independent, positive impact on student outcomes, 
the underlying mechanisms are not entirely clear. High 
expectations might lead a teacher to alter the way they 
deliver instruction to a student, either consciously or uncon-
sciously. For instance, Proctor (1984) found that
[t]eachers are less apt to direct instruction to low-expectation 
students, are less likely to be aware of, or more likely to tolerate, 
non-attending behavior on the part of such students, and tend to 
place fewer demands on them for classroom performance, 
homework assignments, and overall academic effort. (p. 472).
Teachers might also be directly communicating their high 
expectations to the given student, who may in turn alter their 
own behavior. The study by Papageorge et al. (2020) lends 
support to this potential pathway, since they found that high 
expectations led to students spending slightly more time on 
their homework. When teachers make their high expectations 
known, students might also find themselves reevaluating their 
own self-beliefs about what they can accomplish. In this 
sense, teachers’ expressed beliefs about a student’s capacity 
for growth also connects to the literature on the benefits of a 
growth mindset (see, e.g., Dweck, 2008).11 Seaton (2018) pro-
vides a conceptual framework grounded in psychological 
theory for how a teacher’s growth mindset can stimulate their 
students’ growth mindsets, thus providing another potential 
pathway for positive effects of teacher expectations. Consistent 
with this idea, Papageorge et al. (2020) found that students 
exposed to higher teacher expectations also held higher expec-
tations of their own educational prospects 2 years later.
Potential Bias in Teacher Expectations
Teacher expectations can also be harmful if they are shaped 
by implicit biases (Proctor, 1984). Indeed, it has been shown in 
many contexts that people have implicit association biases of 
which they themselves are not aware (Correll et al., 2007; 
Green et al., 2007; Tyler Eastman & Billings, 2001). Teachers 
may be expecting students to act or perform in accordance with 
their biases and may disregard contradictory evidence of change 
(Ferguson, 2003; Proctor, 1984; Rubie-Davies et al., 2006).
Burgess and Greaves (2013) detected troubling racialized 
patterns when comparing blinded versus nonblinded assess-
ments of ethnic minority students’ work. Likewise, Gershenson 
et al. (2016) found that a Black student receives systemati-
cally lower expectations from non-Black teachers than Black 
teachers, particularly for male students in math. Their work is 
part of a growing body of literature that documents the impor-
tance of students being taught by teachers of their same race 
to academic and behavioral outcomes (e.g., Dee, 2004, 2005; 
Egalite et al., 2015; Gershenson et al., 2018; Holt & 
Gershenson, 2019). We cannot conduct a so-called race-match 
analysis because our data set does not include teacher demo-
graphics. However, given the potential for high expectations 
to improve student outcomes, we do explore differential target 
setting by student race/ethnicity.
Sample and Methods
Analytic Sample
The SLO process began in 2011–2012 as part of a TIF 
Initiative, which was targeted to high-needs schools. Of the 
district's 64 schools, 23 met the “high-needs” TIF defini-
tion—more than 50% of the school’s students are FRPL-
eligible—and eight schools were selected to participate (five 
elementary, two middle, one high). In this study, we examine 
all learning targets set in the seven SLO schools serving 
Grades 4 through 8 (i.e., all schools except the high school).
In Table 1, we present average pretreatment means (left) 
and trends (right) in school-level demographics and standard-
ized test scores from 2007–2008 through 2010–2011—the 
pre-SLO period—for the group of seven SLO schools. To pro-
vide the reader with a sense of how these schools compared 
with other district schools serving Grades 4 through 8, we also 
present these descriptives for the other 16 high-needs schools, 
as well as the remaining 34 K–8 schools. Table 1 shows that 
the seven SLO schools served a higher percentage of FRPL-
eligible students than did even their other high-need counter-
parts. The SLO schools were also, on average, lower 
performing on state tests than other schools in the district.
In Table 2, we present counts of unique students and teach-
ers in the analytic sample, overall, by year, grade, school, 
and—for students—by race/ethnicity (the data set does not 
include teacher demographics). The teacher counts capture 
the unique number of teachers who are responsible for teach-
ing and setting targets for students. In Grades 4 and 5, the 
number of unique ELA and math teachers is exactly the same 
because a single teacher provides all four targets (both tests, 
both subjects). In Grades 6 through 8, a different teacher pro-
vides a students’ two math targets (both tests) than the teacher 
who provides that students’ two ELA targets. For this reason, 
we separately analyze elementary and middle schools when 
looking across all four targets. In this sample, no students 
were assigned to the same teacher for more than 1 year.
Methods
Research Question 1: Target-Setting Descriptives. We 
begin by presenting descriptives for target setting in the 
current district. This includes the number of targets set and 
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TABLE 1
Compare Seven SLO Schools to District’s 16 Other “High Needs” Schools, and All Other District Schools Serving Grades 4 to 8, 
Preonset of SLO System in 2012
Descriptive
2008–2011 Pretreatment means 2008–2011 Pretreatment trends
Seven SLO 
schools










Percent White 6.8 28.2 61.4*** −1.3 −0.3 −0.9
Percent Black 84.6 56.7 21.6*** 4.2 1.7 0.7%**
Percent Latino/(a) 3.1 8.5 5.4* 0.5 0.9 0.5
Percent Asian 0.7 3.0 9.3*** 0.2 −0.1 0.9*
Percent FRPL-eligible 77.4 67.5 27.0*** 5.2 5.1 2.5**
Percent limited english proficiency 2.7 10.4 8.6 1.1 0.2 0.9
ELA statewide test score −0.620 −0.305 0.184*** −0.020 0.001 −0.002
Math statewide test score −0.658 −0.263 0.184*** 0.035 −0.027 −0.005
History statewide test score −0.635 −0.314 0.180*** −0.016 0.006 0.001
Science statewide test score −0.696 −0.352 0.205*** 0.024 0.049 −0.015
Note. The seven SLO schools do not include high schools, and therefore we do not include the district’s high schools in the comparison groups. Test scores 
on the statewide assessment, statewide standardized achievement test, have been standardized within this district, by subject, grade, and year, and reported 
school means are among students in Grades 3 to 8. The significance test corresponds to the null hypothesis that the three school groups do not have statisti-
cally distinguishable means of the given outcome, however, with only 56 schools, the tests are somewhat underpowered.SLO = student learning objectives; 
ELA = English language arts; FRPL = free/reduced-price lunch.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
TABLE 2
Counts of Unique Students and Teachers, Overall and by Year, Grade, School, and Student Race/Ethnicity
Characteristic
Number of distinct . . .
. . . Students . . . ELA teachers . . . Math teachers
Overall 5,123 158 155
SY 2012 2,386 66 63
SY 2013 2,404 63 63
SY 2014 2,310 64 70
SY 2015 2,432 75 76
Grade 4 1,335 50 50
Grade 5 1,368 39 39
Grade 6 2,337 25 32
Grade 7 2,252 34 44
Grade 8 2,209 29 35
Elementary School A 289 14 14
Elementary School B 384 21 21
Elementary School C 427 24 24
Elementary School D 401 18 18
Elementary School E 428 20 20
Middle School F 2,002 40 43
Middle School G 1,960 50 49
Student race/Ethnicity: Asian 56 N/A N/A
Student race/Ethnicity: Black 4,478 N/A N/A
Student race/Ethnicity: Hispanic 186 N/A N/A
Student race/Ethnicity: White 330 N/A N/A
Note. Analytic sample of number of unique students who received targets during the 4 years of the study, along with the number of unique teachers who 
assign targets in the given subject. Note that the data set does not include teacher race/ethnicity or other teacher characteristics. ELA = English language 
arts; SY = school year.
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met overall and by test/subject, year, grade, and school. We 
next compare the target scores teachers set for their students 
on each of the four assessments to students’ actual scores on 
those EOY assessments. This allows us to introduce two key 
terms to characterize the targets: the “accuracy” and “ambi-
tiousness” of each target set for test t for student i. In terms 
of capturing accuracy, the closer a start-of-year target is to 
the EOY actual score, the more accurate the target was:
Accuracy EOYscore EOYscoreti ti
target
ti
actual= −  (1)
In Equation (1), accuracy is equal to the EOY target 
score set for test t  for student i , EOYscoreti
target, minus the 
actual EOY score, EOYscoreti
actual , on the same test t  for 
student i .12 When we use the term, “accurate,” we are 
capturing both the teacher’s ability to simply predict a stu-
dent’s score at the end of the year regardless of the teach-
er’s expectations, along with their ability to anticipate how 
their expectations may influence their students’ perfor-
mance. We cannot disentangle the two but both affect a 
teacher’s accuracy in predicting future student outcomes.
To capture target ambitiousness, we begin by estimating 
an expected EOY score based on student prior year achieve-
ment and characteristics.13 The higher a teacher sets the tar-
get for an EOY test score, relative to this statistical prediction, 





ti= −  (2)
This comparison captures whether targets are above or 
below what students would be expected to score based on prior 
performance. We describe targets along these two dimensions 
overall, and whether targets are becoming more accurate or 
ambitious across over time. Finally, we examine variation in 
target-setting behaviors at the school and teacher level.
Research Question 2: Do Targets Predict EOY Scores? For 
two observationally similar students of the same prior skill, 
do we descriptively observe that having a higher target set at 
the start of the current year predicts higher test score perfor-
mance at the end of the year? If a positive relationship exists, 
it suggests one of two mechanisms—or both—could be at 
work: One possibility is that teachers are able to bring to 
bear unobservable (to the district), local evidence to antici-
pate differences in how two students who are observation-
ally similar will perform at the end of the year and set targets 
accordingly. Another possibility is that the experience of 
being given a higher target—that is, higher expectations—
stimulates test score gains. If we find no conditional associa-
tion between targets and scores, it suggests neither of these 
mechanisms is at play.
We adopt the following model to address this question, 
separately for each of the four tests on which targets are set 
for each student (MAP and SSAT, in math and ELA):




i y sy g y
= + ( ) + ( )








For instance, let Aigsy , be the observed math MAP achieve-
ment score for student i in grade g in school s in year y, 
standardized within subject-grade-year. The primary predic-
tor of interest, TarScoreigsy , is the continuous MAP math 
scale score target set by student i's math teacher in grade g in 
school s at the start of year y. Importantly, we control for the 
student’s standardized achievement scores from the spring 
of the prior year, Aigs y, −1. We also include vectors of student 
(Xi y( )) and school-level (Ssy) time-invariant and time-vary-
ing covariates, and, as well as grade (Γg) and year (Ω y) fixed 
effects.
In addition to the covariate-adjusted model (3a), we 
explore three other iterations of this model: The first includes 
teacher-by-year fixed effects (φpy) to only compare students 
taught by the same teacher in the same year (Model 3b). The 
second adds student fixed effects (θi) to explore whether the 
same student appears to perform better in years in which a 
higher learning targets were set for them (Model 3c). For the 
third, we leverage the fact that, in every school year, four dif-
ferent targets are set for each student—SSAT and MAP tests 
in both math and ELA. Therefore, even within the same stu-
dent year, variation exists in the targets set for the student. Up 
to this point, we have described estimating models separately 
for these four outcomes. For this final model, we stack all four 
EOY test scores as outcomes in the same model and predict 
them as a function of the target set for each particular test. We 
include dummies to track subject (j) and assessment (k) and 
replace student-year covariates with student-year fixed effects 
( ζiy ) to ensure that δ  is estimated off of variation in the tar-
gets set across different tests and subjects for the same student 
in the same year (Model 3d). See Table 3 for a summary of 
these four models and the variation in targets they leverage.
Research Question 3: Differential Target-Setting by Race/
Ethnicity. In light of research suggesting that teacher expec-
tations may be susceptible to bias, and those expectations 
may in turn affect student outcomes, we explore whether 
teachers set lower targets for otherwise similar, non-White 
students. We begin with an overly-simplistic approach, pre-
dicting learning targets, TarScoreigsy, as a function of a set of 
race/ethnicity indicators (White students as the omitted cat-
egory), along with grade and year fixed effects. We now 










3 4 i g y igsy( ) + + +Γ Ω ε
 (4a)
Equation (4a) provides a baseline for establishing observed 
differences in targets set for various race/ethnic groups rela-
tive to White students (the δ  coefficients on indicators of 
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students’ racial/ethnic categorization according to district 
records), but the observed, highly significant differences 
alone should not be interpreted as evidence of bias. The chal-
lenge here is that, for a variety of reasons related to long-
standing structural inequities that powerfully shape how 
non-White students and their families experience life in the 
United States, non-White students do indeed perform lower 
on achievement tests. Teachers’ targets that acknowledge 
these entrenched, historical achievement discrepancies 
should not—on their own—be interpreted as evidence of 
racial bias.
However, if non-White students are systematically 
assigned lower targets even when they have comparable 
prior achievement to their White classmates, then we should 
be more concerned about racial bias in target-setting. We 
therefore modify Equation (4a) by sequentially adding a 
vector of up to four prior-year test scores in both tests/sub-
jects, Aigs y, −1  (4b), a vector of student demographics other 
than race,14 Xi y( )  (4c), and finally teacher-by-year fixed 
effects, φpy  (4c). If the estimated coefficients on student 
race/ethnicity dummies continue to be negative and signifi-
cant across these models, then it would suggest that teachers 
tend to set lower targets, within their classes, for their non-
White students than their White students with similar prior 
achievement and other characteristics.
Results
Research Question 1: Target-Setting Descriptives
Targets Set and Percentage Met. The sheer number of tar-
gets set in these seven schools over 4 years underscores the 
magnitude of the SLO system undertaking: In Table 4, we 
show that between about 8,000 and 9,000 individual student 
learning targets were set per test and subject from 2011–
2012 through 2014–2015, for a total of approximately 
34,000 target scores. Table 4 also presents the percentage of 
those targets that were met, the average target score (in stan-
dard deviation [SD] units), and the average EOY score 
received. EOY scores are low—around −0.30 and −0.70 
SDs—which reflects the fact that the SLO schools were par-
ticularly low performing (see Table 1).
By examining the percentage of targets that students ulti-
mately met, we get a first glimpse at whether teachers were 
willing and/or able to set difficult-to-reach targets. For the 
SSAT test (upper panel of Table 4), we find that 43% of tar-
gets in ELA were met (61% in math). For the MAP test, 60% 
(ELA) and 65% (math) of targets were met. Overall, we see 
that students were more likely to meet math targets than 
ELA targets on both tests. We also disaggregate results in 
Table 4 by school year, grade, and school. There is some 
evidence that schools did not all approach target-setting uni-
formly. For SSAT ELA, only 37% of students met their tar-
gets in School B, while 49% of students in School E did so. 
To take another example, while 53% of School G students 
met their math MAP targets, 84% of students in School B 
did so. We do not see evidence that particular schools appear 
to have consistently high or low target attainment rates 
across the four assessments. For instance, while School B 
has the lowest rate of target attainment on the ELA SSAT test 
(and second to lowest on the SSAT math), School B has the 
highest rate of target attainment on the both the ELA and 
math MAP assessments.
The grade, year, and school means presented in Table 4 
could obscure meaningful trends in target-setting over time in 
TABLE 3







effects Source of variation in target scores 
(3a) 7 SLO Schools 
During 4 Years of  
Target-Setting 
Yes Yes Grade, Year Among the 7 SLO Schools in 4 SLO years: Observably 
"similar" students in observably "similar" SLO schools who 
are given different Target scores (+ grade, year adjustments)
(3b) " " Yes Yes Grade, Year, 
Teacher-by-
Year
Among the 7 SLO Schools in 4 SLO years: Observably 
"similar" students taught by the same teacher in the same year 
but their teacher gives them different Target scores (+ grade, 
year adjustments)
(3c) " " All but time-
invariant 
controls
Yes Grade, Year, 
School,
Student 
Among the 7 SLO Schools in 4 SLO years: The same 
student in  the same  SLO school who is given different Target 
scores in different years (+ grade, year adjustments)
(3d) 7 SLO Schools in 4 
SLO Years (4 Test- 
Subjects Stacked)
No, collinear No, collinear Subject, Test, 
Grade, 
Student-year
Among the 7 SLO Schools in 4 SLO years: The same 
student in the same year, who is given different target scores 
on different test-subjcet combinations (+ grade, adjustments)
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TABLE 4











target set,  
in SDs
Mean  









target set,  
in SDs
Mean  
EOY score,  
in SDs
Overall 8,737 43 −0.33 −0.46 8,113 61 −0.73 −0.50
SY 2011–2012 2,249 50 −0.41 −0.40 1,944 38 −0.24 −0.53
SY 2012–2013 2,319 32 −0.04 −0.46 2,162 63 −0.82 −0.52
SY 2013–2014 1,811 45 −0.45 −0.51 1,678 76 −1.04 −0.51
SY 2014–2015 2,358 45 −0.45 −0.49 2,329 67 −0.83 −0.44
Grade 4 1,293 46 −0.40 −0.46 1,357 62 −0.58 −0.39
Grade 5 1,383 42 −0.27 −0.44 1,386 40 −0.16 −0.37
Grade 6 2,095 36 −0.21 −0.46 1,791 63 −0.85 −0.47
Grade 7 2,122 50 −0.48 −0.47 1,825 57 −0.74 −0.55
Grade 8 1,844 41 −0.30 −0.47 1,754 76 −1.16 −0.65
Elementary School A 420 49 −0.37 −0.39 420 60 −0.48 −0.34
Elementary School B 538 37 −0.37 −0.60 539 44 −0.46 −0.61
Elementary School C 510 43 −0.45 −0.52 568 54 −0.41 −0.35
Elementary School D 577 42 −0.21 −0.40 582 50 −0.22 −0.27
Elementary School E 631 50 −0.29 −0.34 634 49 −0.30 −0.33
Middle School F 3,182 44 −0.17 −0.27 3,172 83 −1.21 −0.55




























Overall 9,124 60 −0.7 −0.50 8,591 65 −0.77 −0.56
SY 2011–2012 2,317 60 −0.64 −0.47 2,088 67 −0.89 −0.65
SY 2012–2013 2,288 61 −0.63 −0.46 2,207 64 −0.73 −0.51
SY 2013–2014 2,165 57 −0.66 −0.54 1,971 61 −0.70 −0.54
SY 2014–2015 2,354 62 −0.70 −0.53 2,325 68 −0.77 −0.54
Grade 4 1,335 69 −0.86 −0.56 1,293 79 −0.95 −0.51
Grade 5 1,383 67 −0.82 −0.53 1,311 81 −1.01 −0.56
Grade 6 2,281 56 −0.57 −0.51 2,182 58 −0.65 −0.56
Grade 7 2,117 63 −0.70 −0.45 1,950 63 −0.74 −0.57
Grade 8 2,008 52 −0.47 −0.47 1,855 55 −0.67 −0.58
Elementary School A 410 60 −0.62 −0.45 409 71 −0.72 −0.45
Elementary School B 537 73 −0.95 −0.56 418 84 −1.13 −0.57
Elementary School C 560 65 −0.85 −0.62 563 82 −0.94 −0.49
Elementary School D 580 72 −0.81 −0.45 583 83 −0.95 −0.44
Elementary School E 631 67 −0.90 −0.62 631 79 −1.12 −0.71
Middle School F 3,171 62 −0.46 −0.28 3,176 64 −0.59 −0.42
Middle School G 3,235 51 −0.70 −0.70 2,811 53 −0.79 −0.75
Note. Descriptive statistics are shown separately for SSAT tests (upper) and MAP tests (lower) and by subject (ELA left, math right). Results are reported 
overall and also disaggregated by year, grade, and SLO school. Columns report (A) the number of targets set for the given test and subject, (B) the percent-
age of those targets that were met, (C) the average target score set (after converting them to be standardized at the subject-grade-year), and (D) the average 
standardized EOY observed test score. A standardized score of −0.50, for example, would indicate that the group of students performed, on average, 50% of 
an SD lower on the given test than their peers district-wide, in the same subject, grade, and year. SLO = student learning objectives; ELA = English language 
arts; SY = school year; EOY = end-of-year; SSAT = statewide standardized achievement test.
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school-grades. We are interested in examining within- and 
between-school variance in target-setting, however, a formal 
decomposition of variance is underpowered given that there 
are only seven schools. Figure 2 (SSAT) and Figure 3 (MAP) 
provide a visual look at the trends in percentage of targets met, 
as well as within-school variation across grades and subjects.
Taken together, the results in Table 4, Figure 2, and Figure 3 
paint a picture of SLO target setting that generally did not guar-
antee that students would meet their targets. We can clearly 
infer from this that teachers either did not or could not act purely 
in strategic self-interest. We next examine the extent to which 
teachers appear able to select targets for their students that are 
near their EOY scores.
Target Accuracy. Recall that we characterize targets set at 
the beginning of the year for a given test as more accurate 
when they turn out to be closer to the actual EOY score. We 
are particularly interested in whether targets become more 
accurate as teachers gain experience with the SLO target-
setting process. In Table 5, we therefore present descriptive 
statistics on the distribution of target accuracy, Accuracyti , 
across the four tests and four study years. When Accuracyti  
is closer to zero, the target was more accurate, positive val-
ues of Accuracyti  indicate the target was higher than the 
actual score, and negative values indicate that the target was 
lower than the actual score (refer back to Equation 1).
On average, teachers appear to be able to set target scores 
that are usually less than 20% of an SD away from scores the 
students ultimately received (Table 5). For instance, the average 
accuracy of 2011–2012 targets for the ELA SSAT was 0.01—
very close to zero. On the other hand, the average accuracy of 
2013–2014 targets for the math SSAT exam was −0.52, sug-
gesting that teachers generally underestimated those EOY 
scores by about half an SD that year. In most cases, we see that 
accuracy scores tend to be negative. The exception to this is for 
setting targets in ELA on the SSAT, wherein teachers overesti-
mated actual scores, on average, in all 4 years. The 10 to 90 
percentile range for accuracy is ±0.93 SDs for ELA SSAT tar-
gets—that is, some teachers’ targets can be up about 1 SD above 
or below the student’s observed score. We see a similar range in 
accuracy across tests, subjects, and years.
We were particularly interested in whether accuracy 
improved over time, however, the results in Table 5 suggest 
this was not the case. For none of the four tests do we see a 
pattern of mean accuracy approaching closer to zero with 
additional years of the SLO policy. That said, we do observe 
relatively strong correlations (between .50 and .78) between 
the targets that teachers set and the scores students ultimately 
receive (last column of Table 5); teachers were able to set 
targets that generally aligned with how students would per-
form at the end of the year.
Target Ambitiousness. Recall that we define ambitiousness 
of a given target, Ambti , as the standardized target score 
minus a statistically-generated expected standardized score 
(Equation 2). In Figure 4, we present the distribution of tar-
get ambitiousness (the 1st–99th percentile range15) sepa-
rately for each of the four tests. An ambitiousness score of 
zero indicates that the target perfectly corresponds to what a 
statistical model would predict based on a student’s prior 
achievement and demographics (for brevity, we refer to this 
as the statistically expected score). The solid line is the 
median of the distribution, and the dashed lines demarcate 
±1 SD around the median.
Given that part of the logic behind setting learning objec-
tives is to formalize reasonable but high expectations, we 
were interested to find that the typical target tended to not be 
particularly ambitious (close to zero). With the exception of 
SSAT ELA, we show in Figure 4, that median ambitiousness 
is close to zero and even negative for MAP math (underesti-
mating EOY scores). On the other hand, the distribution of 
target ambitiousness for the SSAT ELA test is centered right 
of zero (median = 0.27 SDs), indicating that the median 
teacher sets targets for this test that are nearly 30% of an SD 
higher than students’ statistically expected scores.
We also find quite large variation in ambitiousness, par-
ticularly for SSAT math targets (SD of ambitiousness = 
0.83). Some targets are therefore quite ambitious (e.g., target 
scores between 1.2 and even 2 SDs higher than the statisti-
cally expected score), while other targets are equally unam-
bitious. Some teachers certainly are setting “reach” targets: 
For the SSAT, 30% of the ELA targets were at least half an 
SD above statistically expected scores (24% for math). For 
the MAP test, we observe slightly fewer targets at least half 
an SD above statistically expected scores: 19% for ELA and 
only 11% for math.
We are particularly interested in whether teachers adjust 
the ambitiousness of the targets they set as they gain more 
experience with the SLO process. One could imagine that 
teachers feel compelled to set less ambitious targets once 
they realize that most of their students are not reaching them 
(in order to obtain larger financial bonuses). On the other 
hand, it is also possible teachers become more willing to 
push the envelope and set more ambitious goals as they 
become more comfortable with the process and recognize 
that they typically are able to set accurate goals.
We investigate this in Figure 5 by examining temporal 
patterns in average target ambitiousness, separately for three 
groups of teachers: (a) those who received no bonus in the 
first year they set targets (in red) because less than 50% of 
their students met their target, (b) teachers who received 
between $2500 and $4000 in their first year (orange) because 
between 50% and 80% of their students met their target, and 
(c) teachers who received $4000 to $5000 in their first year 
(green) because 80% or more of their students met their tar-
get. We display two interrelated factors in Figure 5: The 
Y-axis is the average target ambitiousness (in SDs) of teach-







































































































































Percentiles of accuracy measure distribution Correlation 
of target and 
actual10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
SSAT test
ELA
 2011–2012 2157.00 0.01 0.76 −0.93 −0.43 0.01 0.50 0.93 0.64
 2012–2013 2267.00 0.42 0.91 −0.76 −0.17 0.44 1.02 1.54 0.57
 2013–2014 1719.00 0.07 0.72 −0.84 −0.35 0.09 0.51 0.96 0.70
 2014–2015 2249.00 0.05 0.64 −0.73 −0.33 0.08 0.47 0.84 0.72
Math
 2011–2012 1861.00 0.31 1.09 −1.05 −0.38 0.38 1.07 1.63 0.51
 2012–2013 2108.00 −0.30 0.86 −1.37 −0.88 −0.27 0.29 0.78 0.50
 2013–2014 1604.00 −0.52 0.86 −1.61 −1.03 −0.51 0.04 0.56 0.58
 2014–2015 2224.00 −0.38 0.89 −1.56 −0.97 −0.34 0.25 0.72 0.50
MAP test
ELA
 2011–2012 2125.00 −0.14 0.78 −1.07 −0.58 −0.14 0.30 0.76 0.67
 2012–2013 2127.00 −0.15 0.80 −1.06 −0.57 −0.15 0.30 0.75 0.65
 2013–2014 1930.00 −0.09 0.87 −1.02 −0.48 −0.07 0.34 0.75 0.63
 2014–2015 2200.00 −0.15 0.70 −0.92 −0.53 −0.14 0.22 0.62 0.71
Math
 2011–2012 1947.00 −0.22 0.62 −0.92 −0.53 −0.18 0.15 0.46 0.73
 2012–2013 2093.00 −0.20 0.71 −1.02 −0.57 −0.16 0.17 0.57 0.68
 2013–2014 1858.00 −0.13 0.61 −0.78 −0.45 −0.12 0.23 0.51 0.76
 2014–2015 2185.00 −0.22 0.56 −0.90 −0.54 −0.18 0.12 0.42 0.78
Note. Accuracy measures are calculated by subtracting the student’s observed EOY score from the target score set by the teacher for that student. Negative 
values of accuracy indicate that the target was lower than subsequently observed actual score. Positive values indicate that the target was higher than the 
actual score. Both the EOY observed and target scores have been standardized within the district at the subject-grade-year level. Results are shown separately 
for SSAT tests (upper panel) and MAP tests (lower panel) and by subject (ELA on left, math on right). ELA = English language arts; EOY = end-of-year; 
SSAT = statewide standardized achievement test; MAP = Measures of Academic Progress.
representing targets that were equal to the score a statistical 
model would predict. Then, each data point is labeled with 
the percentage of targets that were met in the given group. 
Here we can see how target performance tracked over time 
with the ambitiousness of targets.
If one could hope for any pattern, it would perhaps be to 
see teachers increasing the ambitiousness over time but 
simultaneously maintaining or even increasing the percent-
age of students who meet targets. We do not consistently 
observe this. Take as an example, SSAT ELA: Teachers who 
did not receive a bonus in their first year of target-setting 
(red) tended to set ambitious goals, but only 25% of their 
students’ targets were met. On the other hand, among the 
teachers who received large bonuses in their first year 
(green), those targets tended to be less ambitious (below Y = 
0) but on average 97% of targets were met. We focus on how 
those three groups of teachers approached target-setting over 
the next 3 years. Unique to SSAT ELA, we see that all three 
groups of teachers notably increased the ambitiousness of 
their targets in Year 2—even those who did not receive a 
bonus in Year 1. In all three groups, only an average of 22% 
to 33% of targets were met in Year 2. There seems to be a 
downward correction in Year 3 and 4, with all three groups 
then lowering the ambitiousness of their targets (though all 
still above Y=0) and therefore having more students meet 
their targets.
We see a clearer pattern of adjusting targets over time 
for SSAT math. Teachers who received large bonuses in 
Year 1 (green) set unambitious targets—about half an SD 
below statistical predictions, on average—and tended to 
have nearly all students reach their targets. This group 
adjusted their target-setting in Year 2, making their targets 
somewhat less unambitious, at the cost at having fewer stu-
dents meet those targets (76%). Only by the fourth year 
does this group set targets with average positive ambitious-








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Making a Tough Choice
receive a bonus in their first year (red). They initially set 
very ambitious targets—their targets were, on average 0.60 
SDs higher than statistical predictions—but on average 
only 18% of their students met those targets. These teach-
ers appear to recalibrate in Year 2, by lowering target ambi-
tiousness (though still positive) and therefore having 58% 
of those targets met. In MAP, we see similar patterns: 
Teachers who receive the largest bonuses (green) in their 
first year (due to relatively unambitious targets that were 
almost always met) tend to correct somewhat, by making 
targets less unambitious over time. In MAP ELA, teachers 
who initially received no bonus (red) set average targets in 
Year 1 above statistical predictions but subsequently set 
less and less ambitious targets over time.
Figure 5 paints a picture of SLO target-setting that involved 
a certain learning curve, in which teachers struggled to find 
the balance between setting ambitious targets while maintain-
ing a high percentage of their students meeting those goals. 
We do see evidence that teachers whose targets seemed clearly 
too low in their first year adjust those targets upward in later 
years, despite a financial disincentive to do so. However, with 
the exception of SSAT ELA, we also observe that the average 
ambitiousness of targets often stayed near or below 0. That is, 
while it was relatively common to observe average ambitious-
ness in the −0.20 SD range, it was much less common to see 
averages in the +0.20 range.
Target-Setting and Teacher Value-Added. Because the prac-
tice of setting targets and adjusting instruction toward 
achieving those targets is part of the professional practice 
that constitutes good teaching, one might hypothesize that 
more effective or experienced teachers set targets that are 
more accurate and/or ambitious. The only imperfect proxy 
for teachers’ effectiveness available to us comes from esti-
mating teacher VAMs.16 Unfortunately, this data set does not 
contain teacher years of experience information (or teacher 
demographics).
We do not find evidence that teachers with higher VAMs 
(in the preceding school year) set more accurate targets. The 
correlations between teacher VAMs and the accuracy of tar-
gets are −0 01.  (ELA, SSAT), −0 16.  (ELA, MAP), +0 14.  
(math, SSAT), and −0 09.  (math, MAP). However, there is 
some evidence of a modest, positive correlation between 
teacher effectiveness (VAMs) and the ambitiousness of tar-
gets. These correlations are +0 21.  (ELA, SSAT), +0 50.  
(ELA, MAP), +0 30.  (math, SSAT), and +0 38.  (math, 
MAP). By definition, teachers with high VAMs (in the previ-
ous year) have a demonstrated ability to produce test scores 
that are above what the value-added model would predict. It 
therefore seems plausible that teachers with a record of pro-
ducing higher than-expected test scores in prior years are 
also likely to set higher-than-expected (i.e., ambitious) 
learning targets.
Research Question 2: Do Targets Predict EOY Scores?
In unconditional models (not shown), we find that stu-
dents with higher targets have higher standardized achieve-
ment scores on the order of 40% to 70% of an SD for every 
1 SD increase in target scores. In Table 6, we go on to com-
pare yearly observations of students who are similar on prior 
achievement, student and school covariates, and are in the 
same grade and year (Model 3a). For reasons that are not 
observed to the researcher, one of those students is assigned 
a higher learning target at the start of the year than their 
counterpart. We further condition on being taught by the 
same teacher in the same year in the given subject (Model 
3b), and then leverage variation in targets set across years 
for the same student (Model 3c).
We generally find that, even for two otherwise similar 
students, receiving higher targets is associated with higher 
EOY scores. Controlling for prior scores, demographics, and 
school setting characteristics (Model 3a), two students who 
have a 1 SD difference in the SSAT ELA target scores that 
teachers set for them tend to exhibit differences in EOY 
scores of about 24% of an SD (17% of an SD for SSAT 
math). Those associations are a little stronger for the MAP 
test: Estimates from Model (3a) indicate that a 1 SD differ-
ence in target scores is associated with about 36% and 47% 
of an SD in EOY test scores in ELA and math, respectively. 
In Model 3b, we examine the correspondence between tar-
gets set and spring scores achieved among students taught 
by the same teacher in the same year. Again, the coefficients 
are large and statistically significant, ranging from 24% of 
an SD (SSAT math) to as high as 43% of an SD (MAP math).
In Model (3c) in Table 6, these associations remain sig-
nificant but are smaller in magnitude, in the range of 4% to 
13% of an SD difference in EOY scores per 1 SD difference 
in target scores. Even once we hold time-invariant student-
level factors constant by comparing the same student’s EOY 
performance over time as they receive different targets in 
different study years, we generally observe that higher tar-
gets correspond with higher EOY scores. However, it still 
may not be the case that receiving higher targets caused stu-
dents to have improved EOY test scores; rather, their teach-
ers could be considering information about the student’s 
context in each year to adjust targets accordingly.
Because a primary confounder in the analysis above is 
that time-varying contextualizing factors may be observed 
by the teacher when they set annual goals but are not 
observed by the researcher, we also explore whether a stu-
dent in any single year performs more strongly on the assess-
ments for which he or she is given higher targets (Model 3d). 
As discussed above, this approach may still miss systemic 
confounders in target-setting across tests and subjects, but at 
least it attends to explanations like a student having a par-
ticularly hard year at home. Because we stack targets and 
EOY achievement outcomes across tests and subjects within 
16
student-year, results in Table 7 are no longer shown sepa-
rately across these dimensions. We do, however, show the 
results overall (Column 1), and then separate the sample 
between elementary (Column 2) and middle schools 
(Column 3). The logic here is that variation within student-
year target-setting may be a little different when the same 
teacher sets all four of the targets (i.e., in elementary school 
where the homeroom teacher is responsible for both math 
and ELA), versus in middle school grades where a separate 
teacher sets the math versus ELA targets.
In Table 7, we again see evidence that higher target scores 
correspond to higher EOY scores. In this case, we observe 
that a 1 SD positive difference in a student’s targets set across 
tests/subjects in the same year is associated with a 22% 
positive difference in EOY scores. It is worth noting that 
observing a 1 SD difference in targets set across the four tests 
for the same student in the same year is not uncommon; the 
average range across the tests is 1.4 SDs. Results are similar 
in both the elementary grades in which the same teacher is 
providing those four different target scores (coefficient is 
0.19 SDs) and in middle grades in which different teachers 
provide the ELA and math targets (coefficient is 0.24 SDs).
Research Question 3. Differential Target-Setting by Race/
Ethnicity
One might be concerned that not all students in the dis-
trict would have equal access to these potential benefits, or 
TABLE 6
Association Between Fall Targets Set for Spring Scores and Subsequent Spring Test Scores, Among Similar Students, Students With the 
Same Teacher, or for the Same Student Over Time (Prescores Imputed)
SSAT Test
 ELA Math
 (3a) (3b) (3c) (3a) (3b) (3c)
























R2 .538 .598 .892 .405 .564 .841
N 8,379 8,127 8,379 7,786 7,737 7,786
Covariates? × × × × × ×
Teacher × Year FE’s × ×  
Student FE’s × ×
 MAP test
 ELA Math
 (3a) (3b) (3c) (3a) (3b) (3c)
























R2 .567 .602 .879 .651 .691 .910
N 8,358 8,097 8,358 8,060 8,010 8,060
Covariates? × × × × × ×
Teacher × Year FE’s × ×  
Student FE’s × ×
Note. Analytic sample comprises students in the seven district schools that implemented the SLO process in 2011–2012 through 2014–2015. All models have a 
baseline covariate vector (unless collinear with the fixed effects) that include grade and year fixed effects, a vector of four prior achievement scores (two subjects 
in each of two tests in the prior year), student covariates, and school covariates. Model 3a only includes that baseline covariate vector, Model 3b adds teacher-by-
year fixed effects, and Model 3c replaces time-invariant student covariates with student fixed effects. Both the primary predictor of interest, the target score set 
in the fall for the EOY (spring) test and the outcome, the observed EOY test scores have been standardized (i.e., we subtract the district-wide mean and standard 
deviation (within subject-grade-year) of the EOY scores in their original metric from all target and spring scores. For the approximately 10% of observations 
missing at least 1 of the 4 prior-year achievement scores, we impute the mean and include a dummy variable indicating that the value was originally missing. As 
described in text, results are not substantively different if we instead exclude cases with missing data. ELA = English language arts; EOY = end-of-year; SSAT 
= statewide standardized achievement test; MAP = Measures of Academic Progress; SLO = student learning objectives; FE = fixed effects.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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TABLE 7
Association Between Fall Targets Set for Spring Scores and Subsequent Spring Test Scores Observed, Across Different Tests for the Same 
Student in the Same Year (Within-Student, Pooled Sample)
Model (3d)
 All grades Elementary grades 4–5 Middle grades 6–8












R2 0.723 0.715 0.728
N 28,058 9,585 18,473
Test FE’s × × ×
Subject FE’s × × ×
Student-year FE’s × × ×
Note. Data set structured as long by repeated observations (up to four) across tests and subjects within year for each student. Analytic sample is composed 
of students in the seven district schools that implemented the SLO process in 2011–2012 through 2014–2015. Results are shown separately for all students 
(Column 1), students in elementary Grades 4 to 5 (Column 2), and middle school grade 5 to 8. Model (3d) includes test, subject, and student-year fixed 
effects. Both the primary predictor of interest, the target score set in the fall for the EOY (spring) test and the outcome, the observed EOY test scores have 
been standardized (i.e., we subtract the district-wide mean and standard deviation (within subject-grade-year) of the EOY scores in their original metric from 
all target and spring scores. FE = fixed effects; EOY = end-of-year; SLO = student learning objectives.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001
that teachers are not able to make these predictions equally 
well for all students. This could arise if teachers possess 
implicit or explicit biases about the capabilities of students 
of different races, e.g.,—a phenomenon that can arise when 
one does not attribute the observable differences in out-
comes by race group to structural inequality but instead to 
underlying capacity. In Table 8, we present results across 
Models 4a through 4d, separately for SSAT targets (upper 
panel) and MAP targets (lower), and ELA (left) versus math 
(right). Again, we standardize the TarScoreigsy  outcome 
variable.
According to the unconditional Model (4a) in Table 8, we 
find large, negative raw differences between the targets set for 
non-White students relative to White students across all racial/
ethnic groups and all test-subject combinations (all coeffi-
cients are also statistically significant, with the exception of 
the difference in targets set for Latinx students, relative to 
White students on the SSAT math test). However, when we 
add the vector of previous achievement test scores to the 
equation (Model 4b), almost all the observed differences in 
targets set for White and non-White students are no longer 
statistically significant and are much closer to zero (i.e., no 
differences in targets set). This remains the case when we add 
the set of student characteristic controls in Model (4c) and 
teacher-by-year fixed effects in Model (4d). It appears that 
Black and Latinx students in this district do not receive sys-
tematically different learning targets than their White counter-
parts when they possess similar test score profiles.
The possible exception to the lack of significant differ-
ences in racial groups’ targets received is for Asian students 
on both ELA tests (but neither math test). For the ELA 
targets that Asian students receive in this district, we observe 
that in every model, their targets are significantly lower than 
their otherwise similar White counterparts. For the ELA tar-
gets on the SSAT, Asian students received target scores that 
were 23% of an SD lower than White students with the same 
prior test scores, other student characteristics, and in the 
same school (Model 4d). The Asian White differences from 
Model (4d) are even larger on the MAP test for ELA, where 
we observe targets 47% of an SD lower for Asian students 
than their White counterparts. We find the lower targets for 
Asian students on ELA tests to be concerning and warrant-
ing of further investigation, though the population of Asian 
students in this district is small (<10%).
Conclusions
We explore a SLO system as implemented in one southeast-
ern school district over a 4-year period. SLO systems serve 
many purposes. For instance, SLOs can address the limitation 
of using VAMs to evaluate teachers, which can only be calcu-
lated in tested subjects and grades. Our results come from 
SLOs in tested subjects/grades, and it is important to acknowl-
edge that target-setting behaviors might be different in untested 
grades. The act of setting targets itself could change how teach-
ers use data to inform their practice, monitor their students’ 
success, and reflect on what seems to work in their classroom. 
The SLO theory of action posits that, through thoughtful 
reflection on data and/or by setting high expectations for all 
students, learning outcomes will improve over time.
While a burgeoning literature describes the implementa-
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challenges that often arise, there is little evidence about 
actual teacher practices in target setting. Teachers face a 
choice: They can set for ambitious targets in hopes that 
doing so improves their students’ outcomes, or they can set 
less ambitious targets that are easier to meet, which in turn 
increases bonus payments. A priori, we might anticipate a 
tendency to act in one’s own self-interest, and given that 
teaching is generally not a well-paid occupation, an up to 
$5,000 annual bonus may feel particularly high-stakes for 
teachers. Moreover, we also might expect teachers to hone 
their ability to set accurate and/or attainable goals as they 
become familiar with the system. Another possibility is that, 
with the limited information at their disposal in the fall, 
teachers are unable to predict EOY test scores with the 
degree of accuracy that this SLO system presumes is possi-
ble. In any of these scenarios, the hypothesized mechanisms 
for SLO systems would be undermined.
We find that many teachers set targets for their students 
that they did not always attain. Depending on the test, teach-
ers only met, on average, between 43% and 65% of the 
learning targets they selected for their students. Teachers 
exhibited the ability to establish targets that broadly corre-
sponded to later performance, generally within 0.30 SDs of 
EOY scores. However, the targets teachers set for students 
varied dramatically in terms of their ambitiousness. For 
instance, while 29% of targets set for the SSAT ELA were at 
least 0.50 SDs above a regression-adjusted predicted score, 
we see equal numbers of targets that were at least 0.50 SDs 
below the predicted scores. We also must grapple with the 
finding that, even when teachers set targets that were lower 
than would be expected based on prior performance, they 
often could not get students to meet those so-labeled unam-
bitious targets (see Figure 5). We nonetheless find evidence 
supporting the idea that students have higher EOY test scores 
when teachers set higher targets for them.
Finally, if racial/ethnic biases are embedded within target 
setting, which in turn may affect student outcomes, then we 
worry that SLO processes could inadvertently exacerbate 
achievement disparities. We do not find, among students of 
the same prior skill, that White, Black, or Latinx students 
receive systematically different targets from one another. 
There is some concerning evidence that suggests the Asian 
students receive lower targets on ELA tests than their White 
counterparts (though not on math tests). These findings war-
rant continued attention, but they should be interpreted with 
caution since only 6% of the students in this district are 
Asian.
Taken together, the current study takes a step forward in 
our understanding of how teachers might react to and imple-
ment a SLO process. Because teachers’ success in reaching 
these objectives often plays a role in how they are evalu-
ated—and sometimes how much they are paid—it is not at 
all clear how teachers will approach this task. Given the 
increasing use of SLOs, both as a complement to and 
substitute for other measures of teaching effectiveness, it is 
important for the field to have empirical evidence about 
whether the theory of action behind SLO systems is consis-
tent with SLO implementation in practice.
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Notes
1. Despite the potential promise of SLOs according to the theo-
retical framing presented above, effective implementation of SLO 
systems has proven challenging. For example, finding the data nec-
essary to create the SLOs can prove time consuming, especially 
where teachers must design the assessments (Donaldson et al., 
2014; Lachlan-Haché, 2015; Lamb & Schmitt, 2012; Schmitt, 
2013; The New Teacher Project, 2012). In fact, assessment design 
is one of the areas in which teachers report they do not feel qualified 
to do what is asked of them with SLO implementation (Lachlan-
Haché, 2015; Lamb & Schmitt, 2012; Schmitt, 2013). It can also 
be difficult to communicate best practices in assessment selection 
or design (Delaware Department of Education, 2013; Donaldson 
et al., 2014; Lachlan-Haché, 2015; Lachlan-Haché et al., 2013; 
Lamb et al., 2013; Schmitt et al., 2009; Slotnik et al., 2013). Issues 
related to assessment design and selection are of less relevance in 
the current context, wherein the district centrally selected which 
assessments were used for each grade level in every SLO school. In 
our interactions with district personnel, it is clear that the providing 
student-level historical test score data, recording the thousands of 
learning objectives set, and later evaluating whether those learning 
objectives were met was a large undertaking.
2. In some versions of SLOs, teachers set learning targets for the 
classroom overall (e.g., the percentage of students who will meet a 
given threshold) rather than setting targets for individual students.
3. In this district, SLOs were set in all grades; however, data are 
only available in Grades 4 through 8.
4. Prior-year test scores were provided to teachers by the district 
as an Excel spreadsheet populated with data only for the students in 
the teacher’s class. The spreadsheets included four test scores per 
student from the preceding spring—the student’s EOY state stan-
dardized tests in ELA and math, and the student’s test scores on the 
Measure of Academic Progress (MAP, a computer-adaptive bench-
mark assessment) in ELA and math. Though MAP is often also 
administered in the fall, no fall MAP scores were not included on 
the spreadsheets. The scores were presented only in a table format 
(i.e., not graphed). Teachers were provided with guidance on how 
test scores could be translated into performance categories or bench-
marks, but scores were only provided in their continuous form.
5. In about 6% of cases, teachers revised their targets later 
in the year. They were allowed to do so either in the case of 
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excessive student absences (20% of the year); or changes to stu-
dent’s environment (outside teacher control) arose that affects his/
her ability to meet the goal. Examples include homelessness; loss 
of a parent, grandparent or guardian; change of guardian; guard-
ian arrest; involvement with the juvenile justice system; illness/
hospitalization.
6. The MAP assessment is used as a supplementary tool to aid 
schools’ in improving their instruction. NWEA’s MAP test is computer 
adaptive and is designed so that its scores can be expressed on a verti-
cal scale. However, in practice we standardize all scores within sub-
ject-grade-year in this article. Though the NWEA is often administered 
by schools to their students in the fall, winter, and spring of the school 
year, teachers were not provided with their students’ fall NWEA test 
scores for the purposes of setting targets. They received only the MAP 
and SSAT test scores from the prior spring. NWEA reports marginal 
reliabilities in the low to mid .90s (NWEA Technical Manual, 2011), 
and the SSAT technical manual reports reliabilities between .87 and 
.93 (State Technical Manual, 2015).
7. Teachers also set targets for K–3 students on different tests, 
however, data are only available for Grades 4 through 8.
8. Exact bonus amounts were based on the percentage of stu-
dents meeting the target. For instance, if 80% of students met their 
target, then the teacher would receive 80% of the maximum bonus 
of $5000.
9. Teachers were told by the researchers at the start of the 
school-year which of their students (who were, in reality, ran-
domly selected) exhibited “unusual potential for intellectual 
growth” according to a pretest and would likely exhibit significant 
growth academically within the year. Indeed, when the researchers 
assessed the students at the end of the school year, the randomly 
selected students did exhibit higher test scores.
10. Hill and Jones (2017) conducted a similar analysis on grade 
3 through 8 student achievement outcomes and also found large, 
positive causal effects of teacher expectations, particularly in lower 
grades.
11. Students with a growth mindset believe that intelligence is 
something one can develop with effort, rather than a fixed trait, 
and research has shown both that interventions can improve stu-
dents’ growth mindset, which in turn improved their educational 
outcomes (Yeager et al., 2019).
12. Though teachers set targets in the original scale of each test, 
we have standardized all scores (including the targets) across the 
district, within subject, grade, and year.
13. We predict EOY scores as a function of student demographic 
variables, as well as all available prior-year test scores in both sub-
jects on both MAP and SSAT tests, with a third-order polynomial 
for each. We include students with idiosyncratically missing prior 
test scores by imputing the mean test-subject-grade-year test score 
and including a dummy variable indicating missingness. About 
10% of observations have at least 1 missing prescore. To ensure 
our findings are robust to the decision to impute, we also replicate 
relevant analyses instead by simply excluding cases with missing 
prescores and find quite similar results, available on request. R2 
values for these models were between .75 (in earliest school year) 
and .87 (in latest school years). We then use the model coefficients 
to estimate “expected” scores for each student in each school year. 
In the approximately 6% of cases in which teachers changed the 
targets midyear, we used the higher target, typically the target set 
earlier in the fall.
14. This vector includes gender, free-/reduced-price lunch sta-
tus, and any observed designation of limited English proficiency.
15. For the purpose of visualization, focusing on the 1st to 99th 
percentile range ensures that the distribution is not obscured by a 
few outliers. We find that, on closer examination of these outliers, 
they were possibly driven by idiosyncratic data entry errors. For 
instance, 34 of the 9,124 MAP ELA targets set (.37%) are between 
3 and 6 SDs in absolute value from the average ambitiousness score, 
and it is possible that teachers accidentally assigned targets on a 
different scale than the EOY test was reported in. Since we can-
not definitively account for these unusual targets, we do not remove 
them from the analytic sample. However, since there are so few of 
them (less than half a percentage), they do not affect our results.
16. We use a relatively common specification of a teacher value-
added model: Student outcomes in a given year are modeled as a 
function of lagged student achievement in the preceding 2 years 
across up to four content areas (ELA, math, history, and science), 
student demographics, school demographics, grade fixed effects, 
and teacher fixed effects. The coefficients on the teacher indica-
tor variables become the VAMs themselves, and we calculate these 
separately for each year and subject area.
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